In recent years, many companies have emphasized adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers in their quarterly press releases. While managers use different names to describe these nonstandard earnings metrics, the financial press frequently refers to them as ''pro forma'' earnings. Managers and other advocates of pro forma reporting argue that these disclosures provide a clearer picture of companies' core earnings. On the other hand, regulators, policymakers, and the financial press often allege that managers' pro forma earnings disclosures are opportunistic attempts to mislead investors. Recent evidence suggests that while many pro forma earnings disclosures are altruistically motivated, some may represent managers' attempts to portray overly optimistic financial performance. If this is the case, then less wealthy, less sophisticated, individual investors are arguably the most at risk of being misled. Consequently, this study investigates who trades on pro forma earnings information. Our intraday investigation of transactions around earnings announcements containing pro forma earnings information reveals that less sophisticated investors' announcement-period abnormal trading is significantly positively associated with the magnitude and direction of the earnings surprise based on pro forma earnings. In contrast, we find no association between sophisticated investors' trading and manager-reported pro forma information. Overall, our analyses and numerous robustness tests suggest that the segment of the market that relies on pro forma earnings information is populated predominantly by less sophisticated individual investors. This evidence is particularly relevant to standardsetters and regulators given that Section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and subsequent SEC regulations are specifically designed to protect ordinary investors from misleading pro forma information.
I. INTRODUCTION
T he managerial practice in recent years of reporting a nonstandard, alternative profitability measure in the same press release with the audited earnings number has generated substantial controversy and debate. These alternative profitability metrics (popularly known as ''pro forma'' earnings) are GAAP earnings adjusted for items that managers deem to be transitory or non-representative of future earnings (Weil 2001) .
1 Managers defend this practice by asserting that pro forma earnings figures provide stakeholders a more accurate assessment of sustainable operating performance (i.e., a better measure of core earnings) than do standard GAAP earnings figures (Bray 2001) . On the other hand, policymakers, regulators, and the financial press often allege that pro forma earnings are incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading to investors (Derby 2001; Dreman 2001; Elstein 2001) . This debate highlights the possibility that, while some pro forma reports are altruistically motivated, others may represent managers' attempts to divert stakeholders' attention from poor operating performance by excluding bad news from GAAP earnings.
2
Recent research examining market reactions to earnings announcements containing pro forma information provides evidence that investors often pay more attention to management-adjusted pro forma earnings numbers than to audited GAAP earnings figures (Bhattacharya et al. 2003 [hereafter BBCL] ; Lougee and Marquardt 2004) . Further, two recent experimental studies (Frederickson and Miller 2004; Elliott 2006) provide evidence that less sophisticated investors are more likely to rely on pro forma information than more sophisticated investors. Finally, a small but growing stream of research provides evidence that pro forma earnings information may be misleading to investors. For example, Bowen 1 Managers do not always label their adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers as ''pro forma'' income. Press releases often describe adjusted-GAAP earnings figures using terms such as cash earnings, core earnings, adjusted earnings, earnings excluding certain items, or earnings before certain items. Wallace (2002) provides an exhaustive list of common nomenclatures managers use to label their adjusted-GAAP earnings metrics. While our sample includes all of the various adjusted-GAAP earnings labels described by Wallace (2002) , we refer to them throughout the paper using the terms ''pro forma'' or ''adjusted-GAAP'' earnings for ease of exposition. 2 Prior research provides a more detailed discussion of this debate (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Lougee and Marquardt 2004; Elliott 2006 ; among others). While we only discuss this issue briefly, we emphasize that there has been considerable deliberation on both sides of the matter, and we believe both positions have merit. It is likely that managers often present pro forma earnings with a legitimate incentive to provide a clearer picture of recurring earnings. For example, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find evidence that some of their pro forma disclosures contain adjustments where managers voluntarily exclude one-time gains. On the other hand, Bowen et al.'s (2005) evidence suggests that managers strategically emphasize the earnings metric that ''spins'' the more favorable story.
operating earnings. We, however, find some evidence that more sophisticated investors' abnormal trading activities are significantly positively associated with the I/B/E/S forecast error. Taken together, these results suggest that the segment of the market that relies on pro forma earnings information is likely to be disproportionately populated by less sophisticated investors. A potential caveat in interpreting results reported in this literature arises from the classic errors-in-variables problem (e.g., Bradshaw 2003; BBCL; Berger 2005) . This problem arises because forecast tracking services, such as I/B/E/S, attempt to exclude the same items from their ''street'' earnings number that analysts exclude from their forecasts. Thus, the ''street'' forecast error generally has less measurement error than forecast errors computed by subtracting the mean analysts' forecast from GAAP operating earnings or manageradjusted pro forma earnings. In order to ensure that our results are not attributable to measurement error, we follow Gu and Chen (2004) in disaggregating the earnings number into components and investigating managers' incremental adjustments beyond those made by analysts. This disaggregation allows us to operationalize an alternative specification that circumvents the errors-in-variables problem.
5 Consistent with our main results, we find that after controlling for the I/B/E/S forecast error (the most accurate proxy for the earnings surprise), less sophisticated investors' (but not more sophisticated investors') abnormal netbuying activities are positively associated with managers' incremental earnings adjustments.
Our evidence that less informed, less sophisticated investors trade on pro forma earnings information while more sophisticated investors do not has important implications for regulators-whose objectives include the protection of ordinary investors from potentially inaccurate and misleading information and the leveling of the informational playing field. 6 Specifically, Section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) directs the SEC to issue regulations to ensure that pro forma financials are not misleading to ordinary investors. The SEC subsequently issued Regulation G in January 2003 to implement the provisions of SOX. Our evidence highlights the importance of continued monitoring of the effectiveness of Regulation G and assessing the need for additional or alternative regulatory actions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the background and the research questions. Section III describes the data and the sample selection criteria. Section IV explains the research design and the empirical proxies. Section V discusses the results, and finally Section VI provides concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The rapid proliferation of pro forma financial disclosures in recent years has fueled an intense debate among supporters and critics of pro forma reporting. On the one hand, managers who report pro forma earnings numbers claim that pro forma earnings represent an improved metric for assessing future cash flows and firm value since pro forma earnings numbers exclude transitory and noncash items from GAAP earnings (e.g., Bray 2001; Weil 2001) . Some practitioners concur with managers' claims that removing noncash and nonrecurring items enhances comparability in time-series measures because the GAAP measure includes items such as restructuring charges and gains and losses on the sale of assets, which have little implication for future earnings (Halsey and Soybel 2002) . Some equity 5 Marques (2006) uses a similar decomposition of earnings components. We discuss the Gu and Chen (2004) framework and this alternative specification in our sensitivity analyses. 6 One of the SEC's primary missions is to mandate disclosures that reduce the extent to which some investors are at an informational disadvantage relative to others (Foster 1986, 40; Hand and Beatty 1992) . The AICPA study group on the Objective of Financial Statements notes, ''An objective of financial statements is to serve primarily those users who have limited authority, ability or resources to obtain information'' (AICPA 1973, 17) .
analysts also echo this sentiment as one analyst comments that the reported GAAP figure is usually an ''accounting fiction'' because it frequently includes nonrecurring items and other accrual accounting distortions (MacDonald 1999) . BBCL document instances where managers exclude one-time gains that results in a pro forma number that is lower than the GAAP number. These scenarios represent a conservative estimate of future profitability. Such examples suggest that some pro forma reports are altruistically motivated to disclose a clearer picture of core earnings. Richard Bernstein, chief U.S. strategist for Merrill Lynch & Co., summarizes the popularity of pro forma reporting as follows, ''But for all the nowobvious shortcomings, pro forma reporting remains big in the tech world'' (Sender 2002) . Legislators, regulators, and the financial press, on the other hand, have alleged that managers opportunistically and selectively exclude income statement items from audited GAAP earnings in order to portray the company in the most favorable light possible (Derby 2001; Dreman 2001; Elstein 2001; Liesman and Weil 2001a, 2001b) . Critics of pro forma reporting are skeptical of managers' claims that their adjusted earnings metrics provide a clearer picture of sustainable ''core earnings.'' Former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt commented, ''Without appropriate disclosure, no investor-certainly not any ordinary investor-can read these (pro forma financials) in a way that's useful. An investor can't know what's been left out, why it's left out, or how it compares with other companies' earnings'' (Levinsohn 2002) . The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has also expressed concern that the proliferation of pro forma earnings is undermining the quality of financial reporting (FASB 2002 (Byrnes and Derhovanesian 2002) . Lawrence Summers of the U.S. Treasury advises investors not to pay attention to pro forma figures but to rely on audited GAAP earnings instead (Wessel 2002) . Some academics also share this concern. D' Avolio et al. (2002) argue that even though GAAP numbers may not always provide economically superior information, failure to follow these standards is likely to lead to inefficient overall outcomes as the ability of regulators to enforce disclosure standards deteriorates.
Despite the skepticism expressed by standard-setters, regulators, and legislators, recent research finds evidence that investors pay attention to various adjusted-GAAP earnings figures. Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) and Brown and Sivakumar (2003) report that investors attach more weight to street earnings figures published by a major analyst forecast tracking service (I/B/E/S) than to GAAP earnings numbers. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) provide evidence that manager-reported pro forma income has incremental information content over GAAP earnings. BBCL report that investors not only pay attention to manager-adjusted pro forma earnings, but they focus on pro forma earnings significantly more than GAAP operating earnings (before special items). These results suggest that at least some investors rely on adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers published by managers.
Two recent experimental studies find evidence that less sophisticated investors may interpret pro forma earnings information differently from sophisticated, professional investors. Frederickson and Miller (2004) find that less sophisticated investors (M.B.A. students) predict higher future stock prices than more sophisticated investors (security analysts) when they see a press release containing a pro forma earnings number that exceeds the GAAP earnings figure. Elliott (2006) reports that when the pro forma earnings number is emphasized in the press release relative to the GAAP earnings number, less sophisticated investors (M.B.A. students) increase their expectations about future earnings, while more sophisticated investors' (analysts) judgments are unaffected by this manipulation. Collectively, these results suggest that (1) investors pay attention to pro forma numbers, and (2) less sophisticated, less informed individual investors are likely to process pro forma earnings information differently from better informed professional investors.
Several recent studies suggest that pro forma earnings information may be misleading to investors. Doyle et al. (2003) find that expenses excluded from analysts' ''street earnings'' have implications for future cash flows. They also find that investors fail to fully understand the implications of these exclusions for future firm performance, and a trading strategy based on the excluded expenses generates significant abnormal returns in the future periods even after controlling for known risk proxies. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) also provide preliminary evidence that investors misprice management-issued pro forma numbers. While Johnson and Swartz (2005) find some evidence that ''pro forma'' firms are systematically priced higher than ''non-pro-forma'' firms, they fail to find consistent evidence indicating that investors are misled by pro forma earnings information. Finally, Bowen et al.'s (2005) results suggest that managers' placement of pro forma versus GAAP earnings metrics in earnings press releases is opportunistically motivated and focuses on the metric that ''spins'' the more favorable story.
Given preliminary evidence that pro forma earnings may be misleading, the investors who are clearly most at risk of being misled are the less wealthy, individual class of investors because extant research indicates that these investors lack the necessary sophistication and experience to fully understand the precision and reliability of their information set.
7 Regulators and legislators are particularly concerned that pro forma disclosures may be misleading to ordinary investors. The U.S. Congress has expressed serious concern that inaccurate or misleading corporate disclosures may hurt the less sophisticated investors (Burns 2001) . Therefore, a thorough investigation of who trades on pro forma earnings information is particularly timely and relevant. Consequently, this study examines investor trading responses around pro forma earnings announcement dates. Specifically, the study investigates the following research questions:
RQ1:
Who trades on pro forma earnings information: less sophisticated investors, more sophisticated investors, or both?
RQ2:
To what extent do more and less sophisticated investors trade incrementally on the earnings surprise based on pro forma earnings vis-à-vis the surprise based on GAAP operating earnings or the earnings figure published by I/B/E/S?
III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA We searched the PR Newswire and Business Wire on LexisNexis for the years 1998-2003 to collect a comprehensive sample of pro forma press releases. A typical pro forma press release contains the GAAP earnings per share (EPS) figure, a pro forma earnings number (an adjusted-GAAP earnings measure voluntarily disclosed by managers) for the 7 In an experimental setting, Bloomfield et al. (1999) find that less sophisticated investors do not fully understand the limitations of their information set, and trade aggressively to systematically transfer wealth to sophisticated investors. Barber and Odean (1999, 2000) conclude after analyzing proprietary brokerage data that individual investors make suboptimal trading decisions and earn returns far below the market average due to their inability to assess the limitations of their information sets. Hirshleifer and Hong (2003) develop a stylized analytical framework to model sophisticated and naïve investors' interactions in the context of pro forma disclosure and show that naïve investors do not appropriately discount nonstandard pro forma information and consequently overvalue the firm, while sophisticated investors do not. Stock price, as a weighted average of beliefs, appears high to sophisticated investors prompting them to sell and appears low to naïve investors prompting them to buy. Consequently, a wealth transfer takes place between the two groups.
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current quarter, and various other details management deems to be relevant. We include earnings announcements in which the company discloses a pro forma number that differs from the ''bottom line'' GAAP diluted EPS number disclosed in the same press release. Our original search uses the keywords ''pro forma,'' ''pro-forma,'' and ''proforma'' and retrieves 50,011 press releases. However, companies often use other nomenclatures to describe their adjusted-GAAP earnings figures. Wallace (2002) performs a detailed categorization of adjusted-GAAP earnings nomenclatures used by companies. Based on Wallace's (2002) list of adjusted-GAAP earnings nomenclatures, we further search LexisNexis using the following expanded search string: ''earnings excluding,'' ''net income excluding,'' ''adjusted net income,'' ''adjusted loss,'' ''cash earnings,'' ''earnings before,'' ''free cash flow,'' ''normalized EPS,'' ''normalized earnings,'' ''recurring earnings,'' ''distributable cash flow,'' ''GAAP one-time adjusted,'' ''GAAP adjusted,'' ''cash loss,'' AND NOT ''pro forma,'' ''proforma, '' or ''proforma.'' 8 This expanded search yields an additional 33,373 hits bringing the grand total to 83,384 potential press releases. After carefully reading each press release, we find that 17,511 announcements contain actual quarterly pro forma earnings announcements. The other 65,873 press releases from the initial searches refer to such things as current period pro forma revenues, forward-looking pro forma forecasts, earnings after adding in results from firms acquired or merged in the current period, or statements referring to prior period pro forma earnings.
We require firm-quarter observations to have data available in the Compustat, CRSP, I/B/E/S, and TAQ databases in order to perform our empirical analyses. These requirements result in a final sample of 5,736 announcements of 2,209 unique firms from January 1998 to December 2003. We collect actual pro forma announcement time stamps from Bloomberg. If a company announces pro forma earnings during nontrading hours (i.e., between 4:30 p.m. and 9:30 a.m.), we set the time of the announcement to 9:30 a.m. the next trading day. We obtain detailed intraday transactions data from the TAQ database. TAQ reports all trades and quotes originating from the NYSE, AMEX, Nasdaq, or the regional exchanges. For each trade, TAQ provides the time of the transaction to the nearest second, price, volume, and a trade condition code. Except for the opening trade of each day, we include all trades with a condition code of ''regular sale'' occurring between 9:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST) in our tests. 9 We exclude the opening trade because it is often the sum of multiple orders and including it could add noise to our measures (Lee and Ready 1991; Lee 1992) . However, our results are almost identical (not tabulated) when we include the opening trade in our analyses. We only include trades with a ''regular sales'' condition code because these trades result from continuous two-sided auctions involving market orders, limit orders, and buys and sells against the specialists' inventories. This is not the case when the condition code indicates something other than a ''regular sale'' (e.g., large block trades or stopped orders).
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL PROXIES Observation Intervals
We examine three trading days surrounding the pro forma announcement date: day Ϫ1, day 0, and day ϩ1.
10 In our analysis a ''trading day'' is comprised of seven consecutive trading hours (since a normal trading day from 9:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. is seven hours long). Day 0, the day of the earnings announcement containing a pro forma earnings figure, begins at the time of the press release and continues for the next seven hours during which equity markets are open. Since our trading days are defined with respect to the timing of the earnings press release, they generally do not correspond to a typical day of trade beginning at 9:30 a.m. and ending at 4:30 p.m. EST, but instead span seven hours of trading during two different calendar days.
Proxy for Investor Sophistication and Wealth
Prior research suggests that, on average, wealthier, more sophisticated, professional investors (like institutions) are likely to make larger trades, while less wealthy and less sophisticated investors (primarily individuals) are likely to make smaller trades (e.g., Easley and O'Hara 1987; Hasbrouck 1988 Hasbrouck , 1991 Chan and Lakonishok 1993; Lee and Radhakrishna 2000) . Therefore, several prior studies (e.g., Cready 1988; Cready and Mynatt 1991; Lee 1992; Bhattacharya 2001) , use trade size to differentiate wealthy, sophisticated investors from less wealthy, less sophisticated investors. Existing research also suggests that sophisticated, informed investors may not always submit large orders. Kyle's (1985) model shows that rational, informed investors often have an incentive to engage in medium-sized trades to disguise their private information. Empirical research also provides support for this conjecture (e.g., Cornell and Sirri 1992; Meulbroek 1992; Barclay and Warner 1993) .
Sophisticated institutional investors, however, are unlikely to engage in very small trades as it may significantly reduce their trading profits for the following reasons. First, breaking a large order into numerous small orders significantly increases direct transaction costs. Second, a series of small orders from one account could prompt the specialist to increase the spread. Finally, breaking a large order into smaller parts would require more time to move all of the desired shares, thereby increasing the chance that other arbitrageurs would enter the market, further eroding trading profits. Consequently, small trades are likely to capture primarily individual trading activity, while medium and/or large trades are likely to capture primarily sophisticated institutional trading activity. Chakravarty's (2001) evidence from detailed audit trail data supports this conjecture. He finds that significant institutional trading activity takes place in medium-sized trades, while the vast majority of individual trading activity takes place in small trade sizes below 500 shares. Barclay et al. (2003) provide recent empirical evidence confirming Chakravarty's (2001) conclusions. Consequently, we investigate small trades to capture the activities of relatively less informed and less sophisticated individual investors and we examine medium and large trades to capture the activities of sophisticated, primarily institutional investors.
Our main analyses classify trades of $7,000 or less as small trades, trades between $7,000 and $50,000 as medium-sized trades, and trades over $50,000 as large trades. We also repeat all analyses (not tabulated) using several alternative cutoff schemes to ensure that our results are not sensitive to specific cutoff points. We use transactions of $5,000 or less, and less than $10,000 as alternative cutoff schemes for classifying small trades. We
The Accounting Review, May 2007 classify transactions between $10,000 and $50,000, and transactions between $10,000 and $100,000 as alternative cutoff points for medium trades. We use trades sizes of greater than or equal to $40,000 and greater than or equal to $100,000 to identify large trades. Finally, in order to examine extremely large orders that could only be submitted by institutions or extremely wealthy individuals, we examine a third alternative cutoff of $250,000 or more for classifying large trades. All our results are qualitatively similar when we use these various alternative cutoff schemes. Figure 1 provides the distributions of the average dollar value of shares traded 11 during each day in the announcement window. The purpose of this figure is to provide a snapshot of the activities of small, medium, and large investors during the announcement period. For example, we find that transactions of $10,000 or lower (encompassing our various smallinvestor cutoffs) comprise approximately 29 percent of total dollar-volume on day 0, the earnings announcement day (second chart of Figure 1 ). Transactions between $10,000 and $50,000 (generally capturing medium-investor activities) also comprise approximately 29 percent of the total dollar-volume on the day of the announcement. Finally, transactions of $50,000 or above (our large investor cutoff) comprise about 42 percent of raw dollar volume on the announcement day. We observe similar distributional characteristics on the day before (day Ϫ1) and the day after (day ϩ1) the earnings announcement. Since our largeinvestor (medium-investor) cutoff captures approximately 46 percent (24 percent) of the daily announcement period raw dollar-volume during the three-day announcement window, we conclude that our sample does not consist primarily of smaller, thinly traded firms in whose stocks large investors seldom trade.
Method and Variable Definitions
As previously mentioned, we hand-collect adjusted-GAAP diluted earnings per share numbers disclosed by managers in their earnings press releases and label them as EPS PROFORMA . We benchmark investor reactions to EPS PROFORMA with diluted earnings per share from operations (EPS GAAP-OP ) from Compustat.
12 This diluted operating EPS figure from Compustat excludes all ''special items'' and ''below-the-line'' items. Several recent studies document that investors pay significant attention to actual EPS figures provided by analyst forecast tracking services, such as I/B/E/S (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Brown and Sivakumar 2003; Doyle et al. 2003) . Consequently, we examine a third earnings metric-the actual EPS figure from I/B/E/S (EPS I / B / E / S ).
13 Thus, our trading analysis complements the BBCL study that investigates price reactions to all three earnings metricspro forma EPS, GAAP operating EPS, and I/B/E/S actual EPS.
In order to ascertain the announcement-period investor reaction to new information contained in each of the three earnings metrics, we calculate the earnings surprise or forecast error for each metric using two different earnings expectations. The first expectation is the mean analysts' earnings forecast. This measure is timely (current) and comprehensive and has been used widely in empirical research as a proxy for the unobservable market 11 Note that this figure illustrates raw dollar-volume, not abnormal dollar-volume. 12 We begin with Compustat's basic earnings per share from operations (quarterly data item 177) and multiply this by the number of basic shares outstanding (Compustat quarterly data item 15) to get total operating earnings. We then divide operating earnings by the number of diluted shares outstanding (Compustat annual data item 171) to obtain quarterly diluted earnings per share from operations. Subsequent to our data collection for this project, we learned that Compustat's latest files contain a quarterly diluted operating EPS number (data item 181). 13 We collect I / B / E / S actual EPS figures from the unadjusted I / B / E / S Actuals file. We use the unadjusted I / B / E / S Actual and Detail files to avoid biases arising from using adjusted I / B / E / S data (e.g., Payne and Thomas 2003) .
The Accounting Review, May 2007 earnings expectation. However, this measure may produce bias against the forecast error based on GAAP operating earnings when it is compared with forecast errors based on I/B/E/S and pro forma earnings figures. This bias stems from the fact that I/B/E/S generally excludes the same items from its actual EPS figures that the majority of analysts exclude from their forecasts. Further, there is overlap between exclusions made by managers and exclusions made by analysts (e.g., BBCL; Doyle et al. 2003) . In order to address this concern, we employ a second earnings expectation-GAAP operating earnings from the same quarter of the previous year (i.e., the seasonal random-walk earnings expectation).
Although the seasonal random-walk earnings expectation may alleviate the bias against the GAAP operating earnings forecast error, it is a much noisier expectation than the analysts' consensus forecast. 14 Thus, we compute three forecast errors (FE PROFORMA , FE GAAP-OP , and FE I / B / E / S ) by subtracting the earnings expectation (measured either by the analysts' mean forecast or by the seasonal random-walk forecast) from the three actual earnings metrics, and scaling this difference by the closing price five days before the earnings announcement date, day tϪ5 (e.g., Christie 1987). 15 In order to examine the reaction of sophisticated versus less sophisticated investors to various earnings surprise metrics, we compute abnormal net order imbalance measures for the small-, medium-, and large-investor groups. We calculate small investors' abnormal netbuy volume (buy volume minus sell volume) for firm i on each day during the announcement period (day Ϫ1, day 0, or day ϩ1) as the small investors' day t net-buy volume for firm i minus small investors' average daily non-announcement period net-buy volume for firm i, scaled by the average daily non-announcement period total trading volume for firm i. We call this measure as SML NETBUY. Again, all trades of $7,000 or less are classified as small trades. The non-announcement period is a two-week period ending exactly one month before the earnings announcement date. Thus, SML NETBUY is an abnormal measure of net-buying activity of small investors around earnings announcement dates. A positive value for this measure indicates above-normal buying activity by small investors during the event period. For example, when SML NETBUY is regressed on FE PROFORMA , a significantly positive coefficient on FE PROFORMA would indicate that when the pro forma forecast error is positive (i.e., good news based on pro forma earnings), small investors' net-buying activity increases, and when the pro forma forecast error is negative (i.e., bad news based on pro forma earnings), small investors' net-buying activity decreases. In other words, a positive and significant coefficient on FE PROFORMA would suggest that small investors trade in the direction of the pro forma earnings surprise. We compute MED NETBUY exactly the same way but based on medium-sized trades between $7,000 and $50,000. Likewise, we compute LRG NETBUY based on trades above $50,000. Our 14 Analysts' forecasts are more comprehensive and precise than random-walk forecasts because security analysts have incentives to quickly impound value-relevant predisclosure information in their earnings forecasts (e.g., Mikhail et al. 1999) . Brown et al. (1987) argue that analysts forecasts are more accurate and less noisy than random-walk forecasts because analysts' forecasts have a contemporaneous advantage (i.e., incorporate a variety of other information than just the past earnings stream) as well as a timing advantage (i.e., they take into account more recent information). 15 The mean forecast is calculated for each firm using all forecasts from the unadjusted I / B / E / S Detail file made within 90 days prior to the quarterly earnings announcement date. The 90-day restriction ensures that forecasts are current. We also repeat all analyses using the median forecast with no change in results. Further, we repeat our analyses using forecasts made within 45 or 60 days prior to the earnings announcement date. Shorter preannouncement windows of 60 or 45 days ensure that forecasts are more current, but we lose observations as we reduce the length of the window (especially when we go to the 45-day window). The main tenor of the results, however, is unchanged when we use the shorter pre-announcement windows.
main analyses regress small, medium, and large abnormal net-buy volume measures separately on FE GAAP-OP , FE PROFORMA , and FE I / B / E / S .
16
We rely on the algorithm developed by Lee and Ready (1991) to classify transactions as buys or sells. This algorithm uses a ''tick'' test to infer trade direction from intraday trades and quotes data obtained from the TAQ database and has been used widely in the empirical market microstructure literature.
17 A more recent paper by Ellis et al. (2000) suggests some modifications of the original Lee-Ready algorithm to improve its specification. We repeat our analyses (not tabulated) using the Ellis et al. (2000) procedure to classify trades as buys and sells, but find no qualitative difference in results.
Prior research suggests that small and large firms have different investor clienteles. Specifically, prior studies suggest that individual traders are likely to account for a greater proportion of the trading activity of smaller firms, while institutional traders are likely to account for a greater proportion of the trading activity of larger firms (e.g., Bhushan 1989; El-Gazzar 1998; Lee and Radhakrishna 2000) . Consequently, when we regress small, medium, and large investors' abnormal net-buy volume measures on forecast errors based on pro forma earnings, GAAP operating earnings, or I/B/E/S actual earnings, we control for firm size in order to ensure that the results are not merely attributable to differences in firm size. We use the log of total assets (in millions) at the end of the previous quarter as our control for firm size (SIZE).
18 Finally, our abnormal net-buy measures control for small, medium, and large investors' firm-specific average level of liquidity trading, but they do not control for investors' trading responses associated with market-wide or macroeconomic factors. Therefore, we follow prior research (e.g., Bamber et al. 1997 ) by including a control for the influence of macroeconomic factors on investor net-buy responses in our regression models, the percentage of all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq firms' outstanding shares traded, MKTVOL, on each day in the announcement window.
V. RESULTS Sample Characteristics Evolution and Trends in Pro forma Reporting
Figure 2 illustrates trends in pro forma reporting practice during our sample period. The first chart indicates that pro forma reporting, in general, increased over time from 1998 until the middle of 2001 and has declined since that time. It is interesting to note that pro forma reporting peaked just prior to the major accounting scandals of 2001 and dropped dramatically in the third quarter of 2002-soon after the SOX, which requires explicit reconciliation between pro forma and GAAP earnings. The second chart presents trends for adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers for which managers use the ''pro forma'' label, while the third chart shows trends when managers use various other nomenclatures described in the Wallace (2002) monograph. For ease of exposition, we group these labels under the 16 We also repeat our analyses using unsigned abnormal trading volume instead of signed net-buy volume. These analyses are less reliable because the use of unsigned trading volume metrics requires that we take the absolute value of the forecast error variables. Thus, trading volume analysis ignores valuable information (for example, such analysis does not make any qualitative distinction between ''good news'' or positive forecast error and ''bad news'' or negative forecast error) and introduces noise in the results. Nevertheless, while the unsigned trading volume results are weaker, the main tenor of the results remains unchanged. 17 The Lee-Ready algorithm ignores the current quote if it is less than 5 seconds old and compares the current trade price with the bid and ask of the previous quote (which is then assumed to be the current quote) to infer trade direction. Studies since then have used a 5-second lag, a 2-second lag, or no lag to define the current quote. Our main analyses employ the 5-second lag to define the current quote as in Lee and Ready (1991) , but we repeated all our analyses using the 2-second lag, or no lag with no qualitative change in the results. 18 We repeat our analyses using market value of common equity five days prior to the earnings announcement date and net sales from the previous quarter as alternative measures of firm size. The results are qualitatively similar. Figure 3 illustrates the frequency of adjusted-GAAP reporting by nomenclature across industry classifications compared to the frequency distributions of the Compustat and I/B/E/S populations. The results suggest that companies that voluntarily disclose pro forma earnings are clustered in a few industries (i.e., they are not simply a random draw from the entire population of publicly traded firms). Figure 3 indicates that firms issuing alternative profitability measures using the ''pro forma'' nomenclature are heavily concentrated in certain manufacturing (SIC codes 3000-3999) and business service industries (SIC codes 7000-7999), while those using other nomenclatures are highly concentrated in financial service industries (SIC codes 6000-6999). Figure 3 depicts that these industry concentrations vary significantly from both the Compustat and I/B/E/S populations, whose distributions are similar to one another.
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FIGURE 2 The Percentage of Firms on both Compustat and I/B/E/S Reporting Adjusted-GAAP Earnings
We next examine the frequency with which individual companies report adjusted-GAAP earnings figures during our six-year sample period and report the results in ] report a pro forma (adjusted-GAAP) earnings number three times or less during our entire 24-quarter sample period. This suggests a second level of self-selection. Not only is it a small subset of firms concentrated in particular industries that voluntarily reports adjusted-GAAP earnings, but these firms choose when to report these alternative profitability figures. Overall, our descriptive evidence suggests that research that employs I/B/E/S actual earnings figures (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan 2002) , or standard Compustat data items (e.g., Brown and Sivakumar 2003)-based on all or part of the I/B/E/S-Compustat population-as a proxy for manager-disclosed pro forma earnings, may not adequately capture the characteristics of the relatively small subset of firms whose managers voluntarily elect to report these numbers in select quarterly earnings press releases.
19,20
19 While Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) use essentially the entire I / B / E / S-Compustat population, Brown and Sivakumar (2003) screen out observations where the I / B / E / S actual EPS number is equal to a Compustat operating EPS number. 20 It is likely that our comprehensive search string does not capture all voluntarily disclosed adjusted-GAAP earnings figures. However, given Wallace's (2002) detailed categorization of common adjusted-GAAP nomenclatures, it is likely that our expanded search string identifies the majority of these reports. We still find that only 11 percent of the Compustat-I / B / E / S population reports these figures at the peak of adjusted-GAAP reporting. Therefore, we feel that the use of commercial database populations to proxy for management-issued adjusted-GAAP figures can largely obscure the unique characteristics of this select group of firms that voluntarily discloses pro forma earnings figures. a Statistics for all variables are based on 5,736 observations. SIZE ϭ total assets in $ millions at the end of the previous quarter; PRICE ϭ stock price five days before the pro forma earnings announcement date; EPS GAAP-OP ϭ Compustat diluted operating earnings per share; EPS PROFORMA ϭ managers' adjusted-GAAP earnings per share from the press release; EPS I / B / E / S ϭ I / B / E / S actual earnings per share; FE GAAP-OP ϭ forecast error calculated as Compustat diluted operating EPS minus the I / B / E / S mean forecast, scaled by price on day tϪ5; FE PROFORMA ϭ forecast error calculated as managers' adjusted-GAAP EPS minus the I / B / E / S mean forecast, scaled by price on day tϪ5; FE I / B / E / S ϭ forecast error calculated as I / B / E / S actual EPS minus the I / B / E / S mean forecast, scaled by price on day tϪ5; SML NETBUY ϭ abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of small investors (all trades less than or equal to $7,000) on day t relative to the earnings announcement date scaled by nonannouncement period total volume; MED NETBUY ϭ abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of medium-sized investors (all trades greater than $7,000 and less than or equal to $50,000) on day t relative to earnings announcement date scaled by non-announcement period total volume; and LRG NETBUY ϭ abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of large investors (all trades greater $50,000) on day t relative to the earnings announcement date scaled by non-announcement period total volume. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. Specifically, Panel A presents information about various firm characteristics, while Panel B provides descriptive statistics regarding the nature of announcement period market reactions. The median total assets of our sample firms is $621 million, while the mean is $6.2 billion-which is higher than the 75th percentile
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Descriptive Statistics
The Accounting Review, May 2007 ($2.5 billion). This suggests that while some extremely large firms voluntarily disclose adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers in their quarterly press releases, most pro forma firms are relatively small. The stock price distribution is also slightly positively skewed with a mean of $25.09 and a median of $17.56 per share. Panel A also presents descriptive statistics for the three earnings metrics. As mentioned earlier, our measure of GAAP diluted operating earnings per share, EPS GAAP-OP , excludes both below-the-line items and special items. The mean of EPS GAAP-OP is $0.06, suggesting that the average operating earnings for our sample firms is positive. 21 The mean I/B/E/S actual earnings per share, EPS I / B / E / S , is $0.19. The fact that EPS I / B / E / S is higher than EPS GAAP-OP suggests that analysts may exclude some recurring expenses, since the vast majority of one-time items (below-the-line and special items) are already excluded from our measure of GAAP operating earnings. Finally, the mean EPS PROFORMA is $0.22 suggesting that managers often exclude more nonrecurring expenses than do analysts.
22 Panel A also includes descriptive statistics for the three forecast error variables used in our analyses. 23 The mean FE GAAP-OP , $Ϫ0.01, suggests that, on average, the GAAP operating income figure (which generally excludes all transitory items) falls just short of meeting analysts' forecasts. Consistent with the notion that analysts sometimes exclude recurring expenses (i.e., more than just below-the-line and special items) from their forecasts, the mean FE I / B / E / S is positive, $0.03. Finally, the results suggest that managers are more aggressive in excluding expenses than analysts since the mean FE PROFORMA , $0.11, is even more positive and significantly greater than the mean forecast errors based on both GAAP operating EPS and I/B/E/S actual EPS. Interestingly, the Pearson correlations among the three forecast error measures are all significant, although none of the pair-wise correlations exceeds 30 percent. 24 This suggests that earnings surprise measures based on GAAP operating earnings, manager-disclosed pro forma earnings, and I/B/E/S actual EPS capture unique, non-overlapping information sets.
Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our abnormal net-buy measures. These variables represent the abnormal net-buy volume (buy volume less sell volume) for different trade-size groups. We observe above-normal net-buying activity by small and medium investors, while somewhat below-normal net-buying activity by large investors during the announcement period. We also find that small and medium abnormal net-buy measures are right-skewed as the means are greater than the medians, while the large abnormal net-buy measure is left-skewed.
Who Trades on Pro Forma Information?
Our first research question investigates who trades on pro forma informationsophisticated investors (e.g., institutions), less sophisticated individual investors, or both. 21 Our sample firms' average bottom-line GAAP EPS is $Ϫ0.04. Thus, firms that voluntary announce pro forma (adjusted-GAAP) earnings are, on average, unprofitable. 22 We compare all three earnings metrics using both parametric t-tests and nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.
We find that central tendencies (mean and median) of EPS GAAP-OP , EPS I / B / E / S , and EPS PROFORMA are highly statistically different from each other. This illustrates that although the three earnings metrics have some commonality in terms of exclusions, there are also significant differences among them. This further bolsters our motivation for using all three earnings metrics in our examination of sophisticated versus less sophisticated investor reactions around pro forma announcement dates because each earnings metric may have a significant incremental contribution over the other two. 23 In the spirit of conciseness, we only tabulate results based on forecast error variables that use the mean analyst forecast as the earnings expectation. Results based on the seasonal random-walk earnings expectation are slightly weaker since the seasonal random-walk is a much more noisy expectation than analysts' consensus forecast. However, the results are qualitatively similar and the study's main inferences remain unchanged. 24 We obtain the following Pearson correlation coefficients among the three forecast error measures:
Our second research question examines the extent to which the net-buying activities of more and less sophisticated investors are associated with the pro forma forecast error vis-à-vis forecast errors based on GAAP operating EPS and I/B/E/S actual EPS. As previously mentioned, we investigate three trade-size categories: small, medium, and large. We expect that the small trade category will primarily capture the activities of less sophisticated and less informed individual investors, while the medium and large trade categories will primarily capture sophisticated institutional trading. We first examine less sophisticated investors' trading activities around pro forma earnings announcement dates by estimating the following four regression models:
where:
SML NETBUY i,t ϭ small investors' day t abnormal net-buy volume; FE GAAP-OPi ϭ firm i's signed GAAP operating earnings forecast error; FE PROFORMAi ϭ firm i's signed pro forma forecast error; FE I / B / E / Si ϭ firm i's signed I/B/E/S forecast error; SIZE i ϭ the log of firm i's total assets at the end of the previous quarter; MKTVOL t ϭ market-wide trading volume on day t.
The first three models examine the extent to which each of the three earnings surprise metrics separately explains less sophisticated investors' abnormal net-buying activities during the three days in the announcement period (day Ϫ1, day 0 and day ϩ1). A positive (negative) value for SML NETBUY indicates above-normal (below-normal) net-buying activities by less sophisticated investors during the event period. The forecast errors in these analyses are also directional (signed). For example, a positive FE PROFORMA indicates good news based on pro forma earnings (i.e., the actual pro forma figure disclosed by managers is greater than the earnings expectation). Consequently, a significantly positive coefficient on FE PROFORMA in Model 2, ␣ 2 , would indicate that a higher (lower) pro forma forecast error results in higher (lower) abnormal net-buying activities by small investors. In other words, a positive ␣ 2 indicates that less sophisticated investors are trading (net buying or selling) in the direction of the pro forma earnings surprise. Thus, the regression coefficients on the forecast errors in these models are interpreted in the same way one would interpret an earnings response coefficient (ERC) in a return-earnings regression (i.e., a positive ERC indicates that price moves in the same direction as the earnings surprise). Finally, Model 4 regresses SML NETBUY simultaneously on all three forecast errors. Thus, Model 4 estimates the incremental explanatory power of each earnings forecast error, after controlling for the other two forecast errors. Since prior research suggests that smaller and larger firms have different investor clienteles (e.g., Bhushan 1989; El-Gazzar 1998; Lee and Radhakrishna 2000), we include SIZE to ensure that our results are not attributable to Table 2 reports the results of estimating Models 1 through 4. Model 1 results indicate that the coefficient on the GAAP operating earnings forecast error, FE GAAP-OP (␣ 1 ), is never significant on any day in the event window, suggesting that less sophisticated investors do not trade on GAAP operating earnings information. Model 2 results indicate that the coefficient on, FE PROFORMA (␣ 2 ), is positive and highly significant (two-tailed p-value Ͻ 0.001) on day ϩ1 of the announcement window, suggesting that less sophisticated investors generally trade in the same direction as the pro forma forecast error (i.e., buy on pro forma good news and sell on pro forma bad news) the day after the earnings announcement. The coefficient on FE PROFORMA , ␣ 2 , is not significant on day 0, but it is marginally significant and negative on day Ϫ1. This result is consistent with the notion that some less sophisticated investors anticipate the pro forma earnings news and trade in the direction opposite the pro forma forecast error the day before the announcement. However, since the coefficient is only marginally significant (p-value ϭ 0.09), we are reluctant to draw conclusive inferences regarding this result. The results for Model 3 indicate that the coefficient on FE I / B / E / S , ␣ 3 , is significantly positive on day 0 and day ϩ1, suggesting that less sophisticated investors trade on information in I/B/E/S actual earnings on the day of and the day after the announcement. Overall, the results for Models 1 through 3 indicate that less sophisticated investors trade based on (1) information in pro forma earnings on day ϩ1, and (2) information in I/B/E/S actual EPS figures on days 0 and ϩ1, but do not trade on the GAAP operating earnings.
27,28
Model 4 includes all three forecast errors simultaneously to allow us to examine the incremental significance of each in explaining less sophisticated investors' abnormal netbuy volume after controlling for the information in the other two earnings surprise variables. The results indicate that on day Ϫ1, the coefficient on FE PROFORMA (␣ 2 ) is marginally significantly negative, while the coefficients on FE GAAP-OP (␣ 1 ) and FE I / B / E / S (␣ 3 ) are insignificant. However, the F-tests indicate that the coefficient on FE PROFORMA is not significantly different from the (insignificant) coefficients on the other two forecast errors. The earnings announcement date (day 0) results displayed for Model 4 indicate that the coefficient on FE GAAP-OP (␣ 1 ) is insignificant and the coefficient on FE PROFORMA (␣ 2 ) is marginally negatively significant. Again, the F-test suggests that ␣ 1 and ␣ 2 are not significantly different from each other. The coefficient on FE I / B / E / S (␣ 3 ), on the other hand, is significantly positive 25 We winsorize all variables used in the regression analyses at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of extreme observations. 26 To mitigate the effects of skewness in the data, we log-transform small, medium, and large abnormal net-buy measures, the forecast error variables, and the firm size measure in the regression models. To avoid taking the logarithm of negative or zero numbers, we add a positive constant whenever necessary (e.g., Ajinkya and Jain 1989; Richardson et al. 1986 ). We also repeat our main analyses using rank-transformed data and obtain qualitatively similar results. Finally we find that, despite skewness in the data, our inferences are unchanged when we use completely untransformed variables in our analyses. This suggests that our inferences are quite robust and not sensitive to any particular transformation. 27 We note that the coefficient on SIZE is negative and significant on day ϩ1 in all four models, suggesting that less sophisticated investors are more likely to buy stocks of smaller firms. The coefficient on MKTVOL is also positive and significant on day ϩ1 for models 1 and 3, suggesting that market-wide factors influence less sophisticated investors' trading. 28 Additional (untabulated) analyses suggest that the significant association between less sophisticated investors' abnormal net-buy volume and the pro forma earnings surprise for day ϩ1 relative to the earnings announcement holds: (1) for all subperiods during 1998 to 2003, (2) for all nomenclatures used by managers to describe their pro forma earnings figures, and (3) whether the pro forma earnings figure or the GAAP number is emphasized (placed first) in the press release. Thus, our main inference that less sophisticated investors rely on information in pro forma earnings is quite robust. 3.65% 46.75*** 17.60*** 3.28* *, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). a Parameter estimates reported first followed by t-statistics in parentheses. SML NETBUY i,t ϭ abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of small investors (all trades less than or equal to $7,000) on day t relative to the earnings announcement date; FE GAAP-OPi ϭ signed forecast error calculated as Compustat diluted operating EPS minus the I / B / E / S mean forecast, scaled by price on day tϪ5; FE PROFORMAi ϭ signed forecast error calculated as managers' adjusted-GAAP EPS minus the I / B / E / S mean forecast, scaled by price on day tϪ5; FE I / B / E / Si ϭ signed forecast error calculated as I / B / E / S actual EPS minus the I / B / E / S mean forecast, scaled by price on day tϪ5; SIZE i ϭ the log of total assets in $ millions at the end of the previous quarter; and MKTVOL t ϭ total market volume of all firms on CRSP on day t scaled by the total number of shares outstanding on day t. and also significantly greater than the coefficients on FE GAAP-OP and FE PROFORMA . This evidence suggests that the I/B/E/S forecast error has significant incremental explanatory power for small-investor abnormal net-buy volume over the other two forecast errors on the day of the announcement. On day ϩ1, both the coefficients on FE PROFORMA (␣ 2 ) and FE I / B / E / S (␣ 3 ) are significantly positive, suggesting that each has significant incremental explanatory power relative to the other on the day after the announcement (F-statistics indicate that each coefficient is statistically significantly different from the other). The coefficient on FE GAAP-OP (␣ 1 ) is significantly negative and the F-tests indicate that both ␣ 2 and ␣ 3 are significantly greater than ␣ 1 . 29, 30, 31 In summary, the results for Models 1 through 4 paint a consistent picture. We find that GAAP operating earnings is not a significant explanator of less sophisticated investors' abnormal net-buying activity during the announcement period. On the other hand, not only is the pro forma forecast error a significant explanator of less sophisticated investors' abnormal net-buying activities on day ϩ1, but also it has significant incremental explanatory power relative to the forecast errors based on I/B/E/S and GAAP operating earnings on day ϩ1. Finally, the forecast error based on I/B/E/S actual earnings is significantly incrementally associated with less sophisticated investors' abnormal net-buy volume on days 0 and ϩ1. Table 3 reports the results of estimating Models 1 through 4 after replacing SML NETBUY with MED NETBUY as the dependent variable. MED NETBUY is designed to capture the abnormal net-buying activities of sophisticated investors. Investors who submit medium-sized orders may include wealthy individuals or institutions intending to disguise their private information by breaking large orders into smaller trades (e.g., Cornell and Sirri 1992; Meulbroek 1992; Barclay and Warner 1993) . The results from estimating Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 indicate that neither the operating GAAP forecast error nor the pro forma 29 One interpretation is that the GAAP operating earnings surprise has no incremental explanatory power after controlling for pro forma and I / B / E / S earnings surprises. The fact that the coefficient on the GAAP operating earnings forecast error is negative could be a mechanical result. For example, it is possible that additional exclusions of nonrecurring expenses can convert an operating earnings loss into a pro forma or I / B / E / S profit. Thus, if less sophisticated investors generally buy based on good pro forma or I / B / E / S news (i.e., additional exclusions of nonrecurring expenses that convert the GAAP operating loss to a profit), their trades will also appear to be systematically opposite in direction from the GAAP operating earnings forecast error. Therefore, it is conceivable that the negative coefficient on FE GAAP-OP is likely a mechanical result driven by the abnormal net-buying activities of less sophisticated investors spurred by good news based on FE PROFORMA and FE I / B / E / S on day ϩ1. 30 Since prior research finds that trading volume is significantly positively associated with the absolute price change (e.g., Karpoff 1987), we control for firm-specific abnormal returns in regression models 1 through 4 as an additional robustness check. This additional control ensures that our results are not attributable to the actions of investors who simply trade following large price changes. Consequently, we repeat our Table 2 analyses after including the daily size-adjusted abnormal return as an additional control variable. The abnormal return variable is never significant on days Ϫ1 and 0 and is always highly significantly positive on day ϩ1, suggesting that less sophisticated investors do react significantly to large price changes. Nevertheless, our inferences are unchanged even after including this additional control, providing evidence that our results are not attributable to less sophisticated investors' response to large price movements. 31 Collinearity diagnostics indicate that all condition indices are well within acceptable levels for all regression models (Belsley et al. 1980) . 32 Interestingly, when we estimate Models 1 through 4 using the seasonal random-walk forecast as the earnings expectation, we no longer find that the earnings surprise based on I / B / E / S actual EPS is significantly correlated with SML NETBUY separately (Model 3) or together with the other earnings surprise variables (Model 4). In sharp contrast, even when we use the random-walk earnings expectation, the pro forma forecast error is still highly significantly positively associated with SML NETBUY separately (Model 2) as well as jointly with the other forecast errors (Model 4). Therefore, the result that less sophisticated investors trade based on information in pro forma earnings is likely more robust than the result that these investors trade based on I / B / E / S actual earnings. .69*** *, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). a Parameter estimates reported first followed by t-statistics in parentheses. MED NETBUY i,t ϭ abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of medium-sized investors (all trades greater than $7,000 and less than or equal to $50,000) on day t relative to the earnings announcement date; FE GAAP-OPi ϭ signed forecast error calculated as Compustat diluted operating EPS minus the I / B / E / S mean forecast, scaled by price on day tϪ5; FE PROFORMAi ϭ signed forecast error calculated as managers' adjusted-GAAP EPS minus the I / B / E / S mean forecast, scaled by price on day tϪ5; FE I / B / E / Si ϭ signed forecast error calculated as I / B / E / S actual EPS minus the I / B / E / S mean forecast, scaled by price on day tϪ5; SIZE i ϭ the log of total assets in $ millions at the end of the previous quarter; and MKTVOL t ϭ total market volume of all firms on CRSP on day t scaled by the total number of shares outstanding on day t.
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The Accounting Review, forecast error are significantly associated with MED NETBUY on any day in our announcement window. Model 3 indicates that the I/B/E/S forecast error is significantly positively associated with MED NETBUY on day ϩ1. When we include all three forecast errors in Model 4, we find similar results. The forecast errors based on GAAP operating income and pro forma earnings are not significant on any day in the event window, while the I/B/E/S forecast error is highly significant and positive on day ϩ1. The F-tests indicate that the coefficient on the I/B/E/S forecast error is significantly greater than the coefficients on the other two forecast errors on day ϩ1. Thus, medium-sized trades that likely capture sophisticated investors' stealth trading activities are associated with the I/B/E/S forecast error and not with the pro forma forecast error. This implies that, unlike the case of less sophisticated individual investors, sophisticated institutional investors base their trading decisions on information in I/B/E/S street earnings and not on information in managers' pro forma income figures.
Finally, we estimate Models 1 through 4 using LRG NETBUY as the dependent variable. Table 4 reports these regression results for large orders. This table shows that none of the coefficients on any of the forecast errors is significant on any of the trading days in the announcement window. This suggests that sophisticated investors do not submit large orders based on the information in any of the earnings surprise variables during the threeday earnings announcement window. Table 1 shows that the LRG NETBUY values are either negative or very close to zero. One of the implications of the combined results from Tables 1, 3 , and 4 is that sophisticated investors generally avoid information-induced trading around pro forma announcement dates (i.e., their abnormal net-buying activities are either negative or zero). However, when they do trade, they likely engage in stealth trading by breaking their large orders into medium-sized trades and generally trade on information contained in the I/B/E/S earnings surprise.
Results from Tables 2 through 4 can be summarized as follows. First, less sophisticated investors trade on information in pro forma earnings and on information in I/B/E/S actual earnings. Second, earnings surprise variables (forecast errors) based on both pro forma and I/B/E/S street earnings have incremental explanatory power relative to the other for explaining less sophisticated investors' net-buying activities. Third, less sophisticated investors in pro forma firms do not trade on information in unexpected GAAP operating earnings. Finally, sophisticated investors either avoid trading around pro forma earnings announcements, or they trade based on information in I/B/E/S actual earnings using medium-sized trades, but do not trade at all based on manager-disclosed pro forma earnings information. Since this body of evidence suggests that less sophisticated investors trade on pro forma earnings information, while sophisticated investors do not, if some pro forma disclosures are indeed misleading, less sophisticated, individual investors are most at risk of being misled. 33 33 One might argue that even though less sophisticated investors trade on pro forma information, while sophisticated investors do not, if the sophisticated professional investors almost always set the price, small investors may be ''price takers'' and thus be ''price protected.'' Therefore, as an aside, we investigate the extent to which small, medium, and large abnormal net-buying activities are associated with announcement-period price movements. We regress size-adjusted abnormal returns, cumulated over the three-day announcement period window (CAR), on abnormal small, medium, and large net-buy measures (SML NETBUY, MED NETBUY, LRG NETBUY) also cumulated over the three-day announcement window. We find that when CAR is regressed separately on each of the abnormal net-buy variables, each is significantly positively associated with CAR suggesting that the trading activities of all three investor groups are associated with announcement period price movements. However, Vuong's (1989) 
Ϫ0.03%
Model 4: *, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). a Parameter estimates reported first followed by t-statistics in parentheses. LRG NETBUY i,t ϭ abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of large investors (all trades greater $50,000) on day t relative to the earnings announcement date; FE GAAP-OPi ϭ signed forecast error calculated as Compustat diluted operating EPS minus the I / B / E / S mean forecast, scaled by price on day tϪ5; FE PROFORMAi ϭ signed forecast error calculated as managers' adjusted-GAAP EPS minus the I / B / E / S mean forecast, scaled by price on day tϪ5; FE I / B / E / Si ϭ signed forecast error calculated as I / B / E / S actual EPS minus the I / B / E / S mean forecast, scaled by price on day tϪ5; SIZE i ϭ the log of total assets in $ millions at the end of the previous quarter; and MKTVOL t ϭ total market volume of all firms on CRSP on day t scaled by the total number of shares outstanding on day t. Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and Mergenthaler The Accounting Review, May 2007
Sensitivity Analyses
Matched-Sample Tests
In order to further investigate the seemingly ''lukewarm'' trading responses of sophisticated investors around earnings announcements containing management-issued adjusted-GAAP figures, we investigate a matched sample of earnings announcements of firms that do not voluntarily disclose an alternative profitability figure in their quarterly earnings press releases. We collect a match for each firm-quarter observation in our sample by selecting a non-pro-forma ''matched'' firm for each of our pro forma firms based on firm size and industry. 34 We investigate small-, medium-, and large-investor abnormal net-buying activities around these (non-pro-forma) matched-sample earnings announcements.
The untabulated results indicate that the forecast error based on GAAP operating earnings is significantly positively associated with MED NETBUY, but only on the day of the earnings announcement. More importantly, the results also reveal that the I/B/E/S forecast error is significantly positively associated with both MED NETBUY as well as LRG NET-BUY on all three days in the announcement window. These results suggest that sophisticated investors generally trade significantly around earnings announcements. Recall that MED NETBUY is never associated with GAAP operating earnings surprise in our sample of adjusted-GAAP earnings announcements, and it is only associated with the I/B/E/S earnings surprise on day ϩ1 relative to the announcement, while LRG NETBUY is never associated with GAAP operating earnings or I/B/E/S actual earnings surprise. Thus, the lukewarm trading reaction of sophisticated investors we observe around pro forma earnings announcements is not attributable to the lack of power in our sophisticated investor proxies. Rather it appears that when firms announce adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers, sophisticated investors either refrain from actively trading during the announcement period, or trade cautiously later in the announcement window primarily using medium-sized trades.
Finally, the matched-sample results indicate that SML NETBUY is significantly associated with forecast errors based on both GAAP operating income and I/B/E/S street earnings on the day of the earnings announcement. However, neither earnings surprise variable is incrementally informative relative to the other in explaining less sophisticated investors' net-buying activities. Interestingly, we never find any evidence in our pro forma sample that less sophisticated investors trade on information in GAAP operating earnings, Footnote 33, continued or LRG NETBUY are the dependent variable. Moreover, when we regress CAR simultaneously on all three aggregated abnormal net-buy measures, the coefficient on SML NETBUY is significantly higher (based on Ftests) than the coefficients on the other two abnormal net-buy measures, although all three coefficients are statistically significant. These results suggest that small investors may have a role in setting prices (which is not surprising given our evidence that sophisticated investors do not engage in particularly heavy trading around pro forma announcements), and as a result may not always be ''price protected.'' 34 For each of our pro forma firms, we first select all firms in the same Compustat size-decile (based on both market value of common equity and total assets) that are not part of our sample of pro forma announcers. From this pool, we then sequentially match on four-digit, three-digit, and two-digit SIC codes. If we obtain multiple matches based on this process within four-, three-, or two-digit SIC codes for a given pro forma firm, we randomly select one of the available matches. In all instances, we use the match from the most specific industry code with available data for our regression analyses. Given that our comprehensive search string likely picks up the majority of adjusted-GAAP announcements during our sample period, our matched-firms, by and large, did not announce adjusted-GAAP earnings figures along with their audited GAAP earnings numbers in their earnings press releases. However, to the extent that our search string could miss actual adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers in matched-sample press releases, it would work against our finding differences in market reactions between our pro forma sample and matched-sample firms.
The Accounting Review, May 2007 implying that when presented with both pro forma and GAAP operating figures, less sophisticated investors focus on manager-adjusted pro forma information.
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An Alternative Specification to Assess the Sensitivity of the Results to the Errors-in-Variables Problem
Prior research discusses the potential ramifications of the classic errors-in-variables problem associated with using the mean analyst forecast as the expectation in calculating forecast errors for different earnings metrics (e.g., Bradshaw 2003; BBCL; Berger 2005) . Since forecast tracking services, such as I/B/E/S, attempt to exclude the same items from the reported ''street'' earnings number that analysts exclude from their forecasts, the ''street'' forecast error will generally have less measurement error than forecast errors that match GAAP operating earnings or manager-adjusted pro forma earnings with analysts' expectation. In order to ensure that our results are not attributable to measurement error, we first use a random-walk earnings expectation based on GAAP operating earnings (as previously explained), and find qualitatively similar, though weaker results. Since the random-walk earnings expectation is a relatively outdated and inaccurate proxy for the market's expectation, the resulting earnings surprise measures are likely quite noisy (although the GAAP operating earnings forecast error based on this expectation is unbiased) and may reduce the power of the statistical tests. Therefore, we revisit the measurement error issue using a different approach. Gu and Chen (2004, Figure 1 ) provide a useful framework for understanding how standard GAAP earnings measures differ from the street earnings numbers published by forecast tracking services (such as I/B/E/S). We extend this framework to illustrate how our three earnings metrics differ from one another and to motivate alternative specifications of our regression models that are not sensitive to the errors-in-variables problem.
We first briefly discuss the Gu and Chen (2004) (hereafter, GC) framework and then introduce our alternative model specifications. Figure 5 illustrates the main elements of the GC framework.
36 GC separate what they call ''Core EPS'' (which is essentially recurring income), from the transitory components of earnings (special items and below-the-line items). CORE COMMON in the first chart of Figure 5 represents recurring items that are included in both GAAP operating earnings as well as analysts' definition of street earnings. Analysts generally exclude nonrecurring special items from their street earnings number. We label special items excluded by analysts as SPEC ANALEXC. GC also entertain the 35 We also perform alternative matched-sample analyses using a ''within-sample'' design in which we examine earnings announcements of our pro forma sample firms for quarters in which they do not disclose an adjusted-GAAP number (as defined by our comprehensive search string). We identify a ''non-pro forma'' quarter for each of our sample observations by systematically going back four quarters and then forward four quarters from the pro forma announcement date until we find a quarter where managers do not disclose an adjusted-GAAP number (i.e., the earnings announcement is not captured by our search strings). We then repeat our main analyses on this set of ''non-pro forma'' earnings announcements. We find that small investors trade on FE GAAP-OP on days 0 and ϩ1 and on FE I / B / E / S on all three days during the announcement period. Medium investors also trade on FE GAAP-OP on day 0 and on FE I / B / E / S on all three days in the announcement window. However, we find no evidence that large investors trade on any of the forecast errors. Thus, sophisticated investors appear to use medium-sized trades in response to the GAAP operating earnings surprise on the day of the announcement and in response to the I / B / E / S actual earnings surprise throughout the announcement window. We note that when the same set of firms announce adjusted-GAAP earnings figures along with their standard GAAP earnings number, we find no evidence that either small or medium investors ever trade on GAAP operating earnings and medium investors only trade on I / B / E / S information on day ϩ1. These analyses provide further support to the notion that sophisticated investors are skeptical about management-issued adjusted-GAAP profitability figures and trade more hesitantly when earnings announcements contain these disclosures. 36 We use slightly different labels that we feel are more descriptive of the various earnings components mentioned in the GC framework.
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FIGURE 5 Comparison of Our Earnings Metrics to the Gu and Chen (2004) Framework
The Accounting Review, possibility that analysts choose to include some one-time special items in their definition of street earnings (SPEC ANALINC). However, it is plausible that analysts choose to exclude some recurring items from street earnings that are part of core EPS (CORE ANALEXC). 37 The brackets on the right side of the first chart of Figure 5 illustrate how different EPS measures are defined in the context of GC's framework: (1) GC's characterization of street earnings, (2) GAAP EPS before extraordinary items, (3) GAAP EPS after extraordinary items, and (4) comprehensive income.
Managers' definition of adjusted-GAAP earnings is usually similar to analysts' definition of street earnings except that managers frequently exclude additional core or recurring items that analysts do not exclude. In fact, Table 1 shows that EPS PROFORMA is significantly greater than EPS I / B / E / S implying that managers exclude expenses more aggressively than do analysts. Thus, the second chart of Figure 5 includes a separate adjustment category for additional manager exclusions of recurring items (CORE MGREXC) beyond those made by analysts (CORE ANALEXC). 38 The left side of the second chart illustrates the fact that analysts' street earnings can have several alternative definitions. Street EPS 1 illustrates a situation where analysts exclude all one-time items as well as at least one recurring item. Street EPS 2 represents a situation where analysts choose to include one or more special items (SPEC ANALINC) and they exclude at least one recurring item (CORE ANALEXC). Street EPS 3 includes one or more one-time items (SPEC ANALINC), but does not exclude any recurring items. Finally, Street EPS 4 represents a situation where analysts exclude all one-time items and do not exclude any recurring items.
The brackets on the right side of the second chart depict our three EPS metrics. Note that our definition of GAAP operating EPS, EPS GAAP-OP , always excludes special items and ''below-the-line'' items. Thus, EPS GAAP-OP equals recurring EPS or GC's ''Core EPS'' in this framework. GC focus on how analysts' treatment of special items affects investors' perceptions of these items. They find that special items that analysts choose to include in their street earnings number (SPEC ANALINC) are perceived by investors to be more persistent than special items that analysts choose to exclude from street earnings (SPEC ANALEXC). While this result is interesting, both analysts and managers exclude one-time items the vast majority of the time. Thus, the applicability of GC's results is limited to somewhat rare situations where analysts choose to include a one-time item. Consequently, we focus on the more general scenario where analysts (and managers) choose to exclude all one-time items. Therefore, although we acknowledge that some of our EPS I / B / E / S observations correspond to the Street EPS 2 , Street EPS 3 , or Street EPS 4 definitions, the vast majority of our EPS I / B / E / S observations map into Street EPS 1 . Finally, as mentioned earlier, managers generally exclude all one-time items (Extraordinary Items, SPEC ANALEXC, and 37 One noticeable difference between our characterization of the GC framework in Figure 5 and the original Gu and Chen (2004) Figure 1 is the placement of analysts' ''other exclusions'' (which we call CORE ANALEXC). Gu and Chen (2004) place analysts' additional exclusions between excluded one-time special items (which we call SPEC ANALEXC) and extraordinary items in their Figure 1 . However, we emphasize that one-time items are classified as ''special items'' or ''below-the-line'' extraordinary items for the vast majority of our observations. Thus, when analysts have ''other exclusions,'' these exclusions are generally components of recurring income. Thus, we position other analyst exclusions (CORE ANALEXC) in the core EPS section of the income statement and place this variable at the top of the ''bar'' in order to more easily isolate the components of different EPS measures. 38 We find that analysts' mean (median) exclusion of recurring items (CORE ANALEXC), calculated as EPS I / B / E / S Ϫ EPS GAAP-OP , is $0.07 ($0.01) and that managers' mean (median) incremental exclusion of recurring items (CORE MGREXC), calculated as EPS PROFORMA Ϫ EPS I / B / E / S , is $0.10 ($0.00).
We employ FE I / B / E / S in these regressions to control for the earnings surprise since the (unbiased) I/B/E/S forecast error is the most accurate measure of surprise or ''new information'' in earnings. Specifically, this specification avoids the errors-in-variables problem because it does not match GAAP operating earnings or managers' pro forma earnings with analysts' consensus expectation to calculate the forecast error.
Thus, ␣ 4 , ␤ 4 , and ␥ 4 capture the incremental contribution of managers' additional exclusions of recurring items (beyond analysts' core exclusions) in explaining small, medium and large investors' abnormal net-buying activities, respectively. Since CORE MGREXC equals EPS PROFORMA minus EPS I / B / E / S , it is positive when EPS PROFORMA is greater than EPS I / B / E / S . Consequently, a positive and significant ␣ 4 would indicate that managers' incremental income-increasing exclusions of recurring items prompt small investors to intensify their abnormal net-buying activities, an indication that small investors trade based on managers' pro forma adjustments. Likewise, medium (large) investors' increased abnormal net-buying activities in response to managers' incremental income-increasing exclusions would result in a significantly positive ␤ 4 (␥ 4 ) coefficient. Table 5 reports the results of estimating these regressions. The first panel reports Model 5a results and indicates that the coefficient on FE I / B / E / S , ␣ 3 , is significantly positive on day 0 while the coefficient on CORE MGREXC, ␣ 4 , is significantly negative. Thus, it appears that a subset of small investors decreases their abnormal net-buying activities on the day of the announcement when managers voluntarily disclose income-increasing adjusted-GAAP earnings figures. In contrast, ␣ 4 is highly significantly positive on day ϩ1 (as is ␣ 3 ). Thus, small investors appear to intensify their abnormal net-buying activities the day after 
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*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). a Parameter estimates reported first followed by t-statistics in parentheses. SML NETBUY i,t ϭ abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of small investors (all trades less than or equal to $7,000) on day t relative to the earnings announcement date; MED NETBUY i,t ϭ abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of medium-sized investors (all trades greater than $7,000 and less than or equal to $50,000) on day t relative to the earnings announcement date; LRG NETBUY i,t ϭ abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of large investors (all trades greater $50,000) on day t relative to the earnings announcement date; FE I / B / E / Si ϭ signed forecast error calculated as I / B / E / S actual EPS minus the I / B / E / S mean forecast, scaled by price on day tϪ5; CORE MGREXC i ϭ managers' incremental adjustments to earnings beyond those made by analysts (calculated as EPS PROFORMA Ϫ EPS I / B / E / S ); SIZE i ϭ the log of total assets in $ millions at the end of the previous quarter; and MKTVOL t ϭ total market volume of all firms on CRSP on day t scaled by the total number of shares outstanding on day t.
The Accounting Review, the earnings announcement in response to managers' income-increasing exclusions of recurring items, suggesting that managers' adjusted-GAAP disclosures influence small investors' trading decisions. The second panel reports results for Model 5b (medium orders) and reveals that while the coefficient on FE I / B / E / S , ␤ 3 , is significant on day ϩ1, the coefficient on CORE MGREXC, ␤ 4 , is never statistically significant, suggesting that medium-sized investors do not buy incrementally more based on managers' incremental exclusions. Finally, the third panel repeats the same regressions for large orders (Model 5c) and shows that neither ␥ 3 nor ␥ 4 is ever significant, suggesting that large investors' trading activities are not associated with the forecast error or manager's exclusions during the announcement period.
Taken together, these analyses are highly consistent with our main results. We find that managers' income-increasing exclusions of recurring items beyond analysts' exclusions significantly increase abnormal net-buying activities of less sophisticated investors (i.e., the small trade-size group), but have no impact on the abnormal net-buying activities of sophisticated investors (i.e., the medium and large trade-size groups). Since this specification circumvents the errors-in-variables problem, our main inference-that primarily less sophisticated investors trade on information in pro forma earnings, while more sophisticated investors do not trade on pro forma earnings information-is robust to concerns about measurement error.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regulators and standard-setters have expressed concern that managers' pro forma disclosures are incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading to investors. Recent experimental research suggests that more versus less sophisticated investors may respond differently to these nonstandard, adjusted-GAAP earnings measures disclosed by managers. Since less wealthy, individual investors lack the necessary sophistication to understand the accuracy and reliability of these disclosures, they are most at risk of being misled. Consequently, this study examines intraday transactions around 5,736 earnings announcements that accompany pro forma disclosures between January 1998 and December 2003 to investigate which class of investors primarily trades on pro forma earnings information: sophisticated institutional investors, less wealthy and less sophisticated individual investors, or both.
Our results suggest that the earnings surprise based on pro forma earnings is significantly positively associated with the abnormal net-buying activities of the less sophisticated, primarily individual class of investors on the day after the announcement. The results also indicate that the pro forma earnings surprise is significantly incrementally informative relative to the earnings surprise measures based on GAAP operating earnings and I/B/E/S actual earnings in explaining less sophisticated investors' announcement-period abnormal net-buying activities. We find that less sophisticated investors also trade based on the I/B/E/S earnings surprise, which is incrementally informative relative to the pro forma and GAAP earnings surprises. In sharp contrast, we find that sophisticated investors either avoid trading around pro forma earnings announcements, or they trade later in the announcement period (only on day ϩ1) based on information in I/B/E/S actual earnings, but they never trade based on manager-disclosed pro forma earnings information. In order to further investigate the seemingly ''lukewarm'' trading responses of sophisticated investors around earnings announcements containing management-issued pro forma figures, we investigate a matched sample of earnings announcements of firms that do not voluntarily disclose pro forma numbers. This additional analysis suggests that the lukewarm trading reaction of sophisticated investors is not attributable to the lack of power in our sophisticated investor proxies because these investors appear to trade significantly around the earnings announcements of the matched sample. Thus, it appears that when firms announce adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers, sophisticated investors either refrain from actively trading during the announcement period, or trade cautiously later in the announcement window. Overall, our results suggest that the market reaction to pro forma earnings information is almost exclusively attributable to the less sophisticated investors.
A caveat in our research design is that it is susceptible to measurement errors introduced by the errors-in-variables problem. This problem arises because forecast tracking services, such as I/B/E/S, attempt to exclude the same items from their ''street'' earnings number that analysts exclude from their forecasts. Thus, the I/B/E/S forecast error generally has less measurement error than forecast errors computed by subtracting the mean analysts' forecast from GAAP operating earnings or manager-adjusted pro forma earnings. In order to ensure that our results are not attributable to measurement error, we extend the Gu and Chen (2004) framework to motivate an alternative specification that allows us to examine investors' reactions to managers' incremental earnings adjustments beyond those made by analysts after controlling for earnings surprise. We subtract analysts' mean forecast from I/B/E/S actual EPS figure to measure earnings surprise. Since this earnings surprise measure does not suffer from the measurement error introduced by mismatching different definitions of earnings, this specification likely circumvents the errors-in-variables problem. Results of estimating this alternative specification indicate that less sophisticated investors' abnormal net-buying activities are significantly positively associated with the magnitude and direction of managers' incremental adjustments beyond analysts' adjustments even after appropriately controlling for earnings surprise. However, managers' incremental adjustments have no impact on the abnormal net-buying activities of sophisticated investors. These results show that the study's main inference that primarily less sophisticated investors trade on information in pro forma earnings, while more sophisticated investors do not, is robust to concerns about measurement error.
These results have relevance in the post-Enron and post-SOX regulatory and disclosure environment. Legislators and regulators are increasingly concerned regarding the proliferation of pro forma earnings figures published by managers, and early evidence suggests that these disclosures may be misleading and strategically motivated. Thus, our evidence that less sophisticated, primarily individual investors trade on pro forma earnings information, while sophisticated institutional investors do not, is relevant to standard-setters and regulators mandating and monitoring corporate disclosures to protect the interests of potentially less informed investors.
